페이지 정보작성자 편집국 작성일20-09-01 21:38 댓글0건
[Reminiscences]Chapter 19 3. The Last of the Independence Army Forces
3. The Last of the Independence Army Forces
The Independence Army raised the flag of armed struggle at a stage of Korean history when the country was mourning over the loss of its sovereignty. It was the product of a burning desire for independence on the part of patriots who fought desperately to win back their lost national sovereignty through a volunteer-army struggle, through a patriotic cultural enlightenment movement\and through various other forms of struggle, legal\and illegal, armed\and unarmed. Though in decline because it was lagging behind the times\and lacking a strong mass foundation, the Independence Army was the only anti-Japanese armed force that represented the nationalist movement.
Highly appreciating the fact that the Independence Army wanted to destroy Japanese imperialism by force of arms rather than petitioning\or begging for independence, the great leader extended his efforts to work with themrom the very first days of raising the torch of the anti-Japanese revolution.
It was while the great leader was paying a visit to Commander Ryang in southern Manchuria that he first developed a strong wish to fight in the forefront of resistance against the Japanese, shoulder to shoulder with the Independence Army. This noble\and patriotic desire was to bear fruit several years later.
Choe Chun Guk\and Choe Yun Gu, in support of the great leader’s line of cooperation with the Independence Army, played an important role in paving this army’s way to convertingrom anti-communism to pro-communism\and in leading them to come over to the side of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in a just cause.
What kind of a man was Choe Yun Gu?
On a visit to the Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery on Mt. Taesong in October 1975, the respected leader paused for a long time in front of Choe Yun Gu’s bust\and talked a great deal about him in recollection. Choe Yun Gu’s personality\and how he changed his outlook thus became known to the public in greater detail.
The following is a systematic\selection of what the leader said on that occasion about Choe Yun Gu to the officials of the Party History Institute\and those of the Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery, as well as statements he made on other occasions to historians of the anti-Japanese revolution, to writers\and to those in charge of various revolutionary sites.
Choe Yun Gu wasrom Uiju, North Phyongan Province. Many renowned champions of independence camerom the area along the Amnok River in North Phyongan Province, among them O Tong Jin, Ryang Se Bong, Jang Chol Ho, Ri Kwan Rin, Kim Si U, Choe Tong O,\and Kong Yong.
When I went to Fusong in 1925, many people accompanied my father to meet me, coming out as far as Daying. One of them was Choe Yun Gu. At that time Choe Yun Gu was a man of low rank, although he became deputy commander\and then commander of the Independence Army in its later years.
When I was going to primary school in Fusong the local people called him Chamsa Choe. My father\and mother\and his immediate superiors, Jang Chol Ho, O Tong Jin\and Ryang Se Bong, also addressed him as such.
“Chamsa” indicated his military rank. After his promotion to platoon leader, I called him “Uncle Chamsa”,\and even after he came over to us in command of his unit, I still addressed him as Uncle Chamsa whenever we were alone.
Choe Yun Gu, too, liked me to call him that. If I had called him Platoon Leader he might have felt uncomfortable.
He was a man of few words, although his mind was full of ideas. He was a typical soldier in that he was taciturn, thoughtful, broad-minded\and a man of guts.
My father said that Choe Yun Gu had trained himself in martial artsrom his boyhood on by wearing sand bags around his shins. If this is true, it shows that he must have had a great ambition even in his childhood. He must have been influenced in his childhood by the Righteous Volunteers\and soldiers of the Independence Army who had frequented the area along the Amnok River.
Choe Yun Gu’s father was a smith. After attending the Confucian village school for some time, he worked, helping his father in his forge when he was barely more than ten. One wintry day I saw him stripped to the waist\and having a cold rub-down, muscles bulging all over his body like those of a martial arts champion. My father admired him, saying that to be a man one needed to be sturdy like him.
When he was seventeen\or eighteen years old, Choe Yun Gu joined the Independence Army\and went to Maoershan, Linjiang County, the base of the Paeksan Armed Group5.
One day, talking with my father about Choe Yun Gu, old man O Tong Jin commented that Choe was the stuff generals were made of. His words made a strong impression on me. Choe was worthy of such praise not only for his strong build but for his manly qualities\and character as well. He went through many battles. According to Kim Myong Jun, who had been Choe’s subordinate in his days in the Independence Army, Choe used to fight at the forefront in battles even after he became deputy commander. To be candid, in my days at Fusong I respected him as a very important person in the independence movement.
My father loved him as if he were his own brother.
When my father was ill, Choe Yun Gu in company with Jang Chol Ho came to ask about him almost every day. When my father died, he brought all his men to the funeral\and mourned over the loss. He wore hempen headgear, as a mourner would do,\and cried bitterly. At that time he consoled me warmly\and with many encouraging words. Still now I feel grateful to him for his sympathy.
I don’t know much about his principles\or doctrines when he belonged to Jongui-bu. If I were to judge his ideas by using his attitude towards communism as a criterion, I should say that he was more pro-communist than anti-communist. But he did not convert himself to the communist movement as early as Kong Yong\or Pak Jin Yong did.
Among my father’s companions there were many people who espoused new ideological trends, but few of them changed their direction to come over to the communist camp.
In those years the people who adopted the new ideological trend of communism in southern\and central Manchuria were surrounded by nationalists. If advocates of communism had been in the majority in these areas, we would not have suffered terrorism at the hands of the reactionary upper-crust that made up the Kukmin-bu when we visited Wangqingmen.
By contrast, in eastern Manchuria, communist ideology prevailed over nationalism. As soon as it appeared, communism swept over the whole region\and became predominant before nationalism could come out against it. There was none of the acute confrontation between the two ideological trends in eastern Manchuria as in southern\and central Manchuria.
As was the case with Choe Hyon, Yun Chang Bom, Pak Tong Gun, Kim Il Ryong,\and Pak Tu Gyong, many soldiers of the Independence Army had no qualms about joining the revolutionary army,\organized\and led by communists in eastern Manchuria. There the switchrom the old to the new ideological trend took place without bloodshed\and with no desperate ideological war. The masses in this part of Manchuria accepted the spreading communist ideology as the guiding ideology of their class\and viewed the switchover of the Korean national liberation strugglerom the nationalist to communist movement as a natural process that accorded with the law of historical development.
In the summer of 1932 I met Choe Yun Gu at Tonghua, but did not have a long interview with him because I had to negotiate with Ryang Se Bong over plans for cooperation.
When we were negotiating with Ryang Se Bong in southern Manchuria, the anti-communist trend was still dominant over the pro-communist trend in the ideological climate of the Independence Army. When we left Tonghua after the failure in the negotiations for cooperation–a failure that was due to the anti-communism of the high-ranking officers of the Independence Army\and the enemy’s machination to drive a wedge between the two negotiating parties–Choe Yun Gu was reportedly very sad.
Although we returnedrom southern Manchuria without tangible results, we did not abandon the idea of cooperation with the independence campaigners. A united front with the nationalists was not a matter so simple as to allow us to remain indifferent over its success\or failure, nor was it something to be picked up when we were weak\and discarded when we were strong,\or to be maintained only during the struggle to gain political power\and to be ignored after success in the struggle. It was a lasting strategic line we had to maintain for complete national harmony\and unity.
Comrades, just think: Haven’t we continued to emphasize the united front with nationalists all through the many decades since the country was liberated? It is absolutely correct that since the early years of our revolutionary activities we have looked upon the line of a national united front as a lasting strategic line that should be maintained consistently for great national unity.
In spite of the failure in the negotiations with Ryang Se Bong, we did not doubt that alliance with the Independence Army would be realized some day,\and we made every effort with great enthusiasm to hasten the arrival of that day. We had achieved a common front with conservative Chinese anti-Japanese forces,\and there was no reason why we should be unable to succeed in establishing a joint front with our fellow countrymen. Quite honestly, to remain divided among ourselves cast shame upon us in the eyes of foreigners.
After we moved to West Jiandao on returnrom our second expedition to northern Manchuria, I kept myself systematically informed on the developments in the Independence Army in southern Manchuria through different channels, while continuing with my efforts to bring about cooperation with them. I sent a messenger to deliver the Inaugural Declaration\and the Ten-Point Programme of the ARF to them. As a first step, I gave an assignment to work on cooperation with the Independence Army to some of the Korean comrades who were active in the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in southern Manchuria. Ri Tong Gwang worked with the Independence Army in the capacity of south Manchurian representative of the ARF.
The Independence Army, however, was dead set against cooperation. After Ryang Se Bong’s death, this army came under the command of Kim Hwal Sok, a die-hard anti-communist. Of course, a considerable number of officers\and men in the army were open to the new ideological trend\and wanted cooperation with the communists. However, because of the formidable right-wing force that had followed the dyed-in-the-wool anti-communists, like Ko I Ho\and Hyon Muk Kwanrom the years of Kukmin-bu, our efforts to cooperate with them made little progress. During Ryang Se Bong’s lifetime, he had carried out joint actions with Yang Jing-yu’s unit, but even this hard-won initial success was not developed further in the years of Kim Hwal Sok, owing to the anti-communist top hierarchy of the Independence Army.
To bring Kim Hwal Sok round to a coalition with the communists was an urgent matter that would affect the destiny of hundreds of officers\and men under his command.
Frankly speaking, our reason for attaching such great importance to cooperation with the Independence Army was not because we were after some great benefitrom them.
By 1936 the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army had grown into a great force in terms of both numerical strength\and fighting efficiency. We were prepared to fight on our own without their help.
By contrast, the Independence Army was on the decline\and extremely hard up for everything. Their ranks were dwindling continuously,\and they were so short of weapons that some of them had to be equipped with spears\and clubs. The weakened Independence Army used to sneak awayrom the enemy instead of fighting,\and there was no way for them to get new supplies of weapons\and ammunition. Their food\and clothing situation was much the same.
Kim Myong Jun, a veteran of the anti-Japanese revolution\and Choe Yun Gu’s mate in the Independence Army under Kim Hwal Sok’s command, was later to come over to the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army. In a note written in 1960, Kim Myong Jun recalled his enlistment in the Independence Army\and its circumstances in subsequent years:
“In autumn 1932 we... went to an Independence Army unit which was billeted in a village near Mt. Yantong. The village was busy with preparations to welcome the soldiers. My companion\and I went to help the people butcher pigs in\order to win favourrom the soldiers. We also ran some errands for the sentry. But the commanding officers of the Independence Army rejected our application for enlistment because we were too young.
“That night we followed close behind the moving unit with firm determination to join the army. We gave them a helping hand with great enthusiasm\wherever they stopped. A company commander was at last moved by our unremitting service\and our enthusiasm for enlistment\and permitted us to join his company. No word can describe our delight at the time.
“Before long, however, we were disappointed as we came to realize that the Independence Army was not the army we had dreamed of. This army, the object of our burning adoration, was so short of weapons that some of its soldiers were carrying clubs. We had expected to get rifles as soon as we joined, but we had to borrow a matchlockrom our seniors whenever we went to stand sentry.”
After joining the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, Kim Myong Jun was by the side of the great leader for some years at the Far Eastern training base during small-unit actions.
The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung learned a lotrom him about the various aspects of the Independence Army under the command of Kim Hwal Sok. The great leader said that the Independence Army’s transition in the wake of Choe Yun Gu to the KPRA was an inevitable result of the development of the nationalist movement in our country.
The Independence Army raised moneyrom among the people to buy weapons\and also requisitioned food\and clothingrom the people\and relied on them for their shelter. They levied an “annual tax in kind” upon the people in the areas under their control.
The tax collectors used to call in people\and check their payment by household. People who failed to pay the required amount by the deadline were given a good dressing down,\or were even whipped.
Just as the Jongui-bu did in the past, the army of the Kukmin-bu, too, lorded it over southern Manchuria as if it were their own independent state.
According to Kim Myong Jun, the Independence Army abandoned its\original cause around the mid-1930s\and gradually degenerated into bandits.
When they ran out of food supplies, one of their small units would rob the raftsmen on the Amnok River of their food. In the guise of bandits, they would hide at a bottleneck in the river, let off a few rounds of threatening fire when the rafts approached, get them to row to the water’s edge\and then rob the raftsmen of their food.
What a disgrace to the Independence Army! Even a last resort should have some\limits. It was truly shameful for the Independence Army to have come to this pass–an army that should have protected\and helped to save the people! Discipline in this army gradually loosened as well,\and deserters appeared one after another. Kim Myong Jun’s platoon leader stole his commander’s seal, pistol\and moneyrom the locker at headquarters\and ran away with some of his men who were on duty. When encountering soldiers of the Independence Army, even mountain rebels disarmed them. The Independence Army was isolated literallyrom every quarter.
We did not wish to see them disintegrating without having accomplished their cause. Their collapse would only gladden the Japanese imperialists\and bring us nothing good. At a time when quite a few patriots had left the independence movement\or had become servants of the enemy, it was important for Korea that the Independence Army remained in existence as an armed force\and pursued its\original aim. As such it would have won the people’s support\and love. In their latter years they did nothing worth mentioning, but in the initial period\and in the middle stage of their activities, they had fought many battles\and had a great many successes.
In later years the commanding officers of the Independence Army had done their best to arrest its collapse, threatened as the army was by repeated “punitive” attacks by Japanese\and Manchurian police\and armed forces\and by its own internal ideological confusion. Defeatism was the most destructive aspect of their ideological degeneration, leading to surrender to the enemy, desertion\and disgraceful banditry.
Kim Hwal Sok, with other brass-hats in the army, as well as a number of other officers\and men, pinned their hopes on assistancerom Jiang Jie-shi’s forces. Harbouring illusions about the Kuomintang, they attempted to maintain their army with its support.
Worship of the strong is nothing special. It appears when a weak person looks up to others\and seeks to live off them. It is neither innate nor does it fallrom the sky. A man who disbelieves in his own strength\or underestimates it may be reduced to a sycophant, no matter how great his love for his country.
As I previously mentioned, the fatal ideological\limitation of the Independence Army was that they did not believe in their own\or the people’s strength. Disbelief in this strength would end in servility, which in turn would lead to treachery to the nation.
History clearly proves that anyone serving as a flunkey to another nation will inevitably look down upon his own country,\and that a nihilistic approach to one’s country invariably leads to treachery to the nation.
This does not mean, however, that all the officers\and men of the Independence Army pinned their hopes on money\and weaponsrom the Kuomintang. The man in command worshipped Jiang Jie-shi as if he were God, but a considerable number of officers did not. They were much more interested in an alliance with the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army than with the Kuomintang army. The officers\and men of the Independence Army came to know the KPRA through their own experience, not by hearsay.
I still remember what Kim Myong Jun told me when we were at the Far Eastern training base.
Once his small unit of the Independence Army happened to meet a detachment of the People’s Revolutionary Army in a mountain village in Jian County. It was midnight\and the soldiers of the Independence Army knocked at the door of a house to find shelter. But a detachment of the revolutionary army was already billeted there. Knowing that they had been seeking shelterrom house to house, the revolutionary army soldiers readily offered their own shelter. Hearing that they had run out of rations, the guerrillas also shared out their own rations among them.
The Independence Army soldiers who went out to make water before dawn were surprised to find the revolutionary army soldiers sleeping in the open, huddled together around a flickering camp fire. They had neither mattresses nor blankets. They were sleeping on spread-out corn stalks. Who would not have been moved at the scene? The following morning the soldiers of the Independence Army were even more strongly impressed as they saw the officers\and men of the revolutionary army gathering up the corn stalks, fetching water, chopping firewood\and sweeping the yard to help the old host\and hostess. The Chinese old folk of the house were also moved by the actions of the guerrillas. They held the men’s hands in theirs, saying that they had never seen such kind-hearted soldiers before,\and declared that the guerrillas were truly a people’s army.
Thanks to Kim Myong Jun’s mates, all the officers\and men of the Independence Army came to hear of this event. Choe Yun Gu was deeply moved by the anecdote as well.
Gradually it became an irresistible trend among the soldiers of the Independence Army to feel an ever-growing trust in the People’s Revolutionary Army.
They came to realize that the only way to their survival was in their alliance with the People’s Revolutionary Army, that cooperation with the communists was their only way out. We on the other hand wanted the Independence Army to remain strong enough to fight on their own,\or join their efforts to those of the People’s Revolutionary Army in the struggle against the Japanese.
Judgingrom the circumstances of the Independence Army, there was a full possibility of their cooperation with the People’s Revolutionary Army. The problem was how to convince Commander Kim Hwal Sok\and his followers, who were pinning their hopes on Jiang Jie-shi, of this. According to information sent us by our operatives\and comrades active in southern Manchuria, Choe Yun Gu was fully satisfied with the Inaugural Declaration\and the Ten-Point Programme of the ARF.
It was after we founded the ARF that we decided to make every effort to realize cooperation with the Independence Army. We began to put our decision into action after we moved to the Mt. Paektu area\and West Jiandao.
We had previously met with the headquarters of the Independence Army on a few occasions on our own initiative. They were not opposed to our idea of cooperation between the anti-Japanese national forces, but they had given no answer to our proposal for an alliance between the KPRA\and the Independence Army.
At this very moment we gave Choe Chun Guk, who was being sent to southern Manchuria, an assignment to work for cooperation with the Independence Army.
On arrival in southern Manchuria, Choe Chun Guk delivered my letter to Choe Yun Gu\and negotiated with him in secret about the merger of the two armies. Hearing the explanation of our policy for joint action against the Japanese, Choe Yun Gu readily supported the idea of bringing the two armies together. He was a fairly close acquaintance of mine\and was the most stoutly anti-Japanese officer in the Independence Army.
“My unit exists only in name,” Choe Yun Gu said. “It’s like an empty kimchi jar, with all the stuff taken out\and eaten. I myself should like to take my unit to Commander Kim Song Ju right now. If my old commander finally refuses, I’m ready to go alone to the revolutionary army.”
Choe Chun Guk said that he did not wish to see the Independence Army splitting up, even though the deputy commander\and his followers would be most welcome at Mt. Paektu. He persuaded Choe Yun Gu to try to bring his commander to a better understanding of the need for an alliance with the KPRA.
Saying he was not confident he could persuade his commander, Choe Yun Gu nevertheless promised that he would do everything possible to effect joint action against the Japanese. Through his many years of experience with the degeneration\and corruption of the nationalist movement in the Independence Army, Choe Yun Gu had learned that the common front was the only way to survival.
Kim Hwal Sok attempted to reduce the loss of his army through separate actions by three groups, but that proved not to be an effective measure. His army, which was not solidly based on the people, had no sources for new recruits.
Choe Yun Gu felt anguish as he pondered over the question of why:
Why his army was going downhill while the People’s Revolutionary Army was thriving, why discipline in his army was loose\and out of control while the People’s Revolutionary Army was so well disciplined as to strike terror into the hearts of the enemy, why his army had to rob the people of their property to maintain its existence while the revolutionary army obtained everything it needed without having to encroach upon the people’s property, why his army was suffering defeat in every battle with the Japanese while the revolutionary army was winning every battle, why his army hated the revolutionary army as they would a bitter cucumber while the revolutionary army regarded his army as a friendly force. ...
Choe Yun Gu finally decided the reason lay in the matter of popular basis: his army had to fight in isolation without active supportrom the people because it was not solidly based on the people, which meant that his army was unable to stop the process of degeneration\and corruption because it had no popular basis. He believed that his army, which ruled over the heads of the people\and was divorcedrom them, had a gloomy future,\whereas the People’s Revolutionary Army, which was born of the people\and was sharing its fate with them, had a bright future.
It was inevitable that the Independence Army had a weak popular basis. Its activities\and aspirations were motivated by bourgeois nationalism, which had nothing in common with people-centred ideology. Bourgeois nationalism was characterized by its failure to regard the working masses as the motive force of the revolution, by its mistrust in the unity of different sections of the anti-Japanese patriotic forces\and by its hatred for communism.
These were exactly what Choe Yun Gu saw as the fundamental reasons for his army’s decline, isolation\and disintegration. He came to the conclusion that his army could remain loyal to its\original cause only through an alliance with the People’ Revolutionary Army\and through its activity on the popular foundation that had been established by the communists.
Kim Hwal Sok, however, rejected the proposal for cooperation, saying that it would only benefit the communists\and that if he agreed, his army would cease to exist. His position was that he would not share the board with communists, even if it meant the premature death of his own army. He would not yield an inch, warning his men that they should not be deceived by communist propaganda, that communists knew nothing but class struggle, that their proposal for a united front was a mere deceptive trick,\and that the best way was to keep awayrom such treacherous people.
While the commander\and his deputy were carrying out the unsuccessful discussions, the situation in the Independence Army became critical. Their food\and clothing supplies ran out\and the army was tightly surrounded by the enemy. To make matters worse, desertion, surrender\and deathrom starvation occurred in succession,\and the morale of the officers\and men fell to its lowest depth.
Choe Yun Gu opened negotiations with his commander to make a final decision. He said, “If you refuse to accept my proposal, I have no other choice but to leave you, taking with me those who support the idea of alliance, even if it means dividing the army in two. If we hesitate any further without making a decision, we shall all be destroyed. Give us permission to go to Jiang Jie-shi\or to Kim Il Sung.”
Finding himself in a corner, Kim Hwal Sok agreed to permit freedom for his men. By his\orders, all the officers\and men of his army assembled. After giving a grim outline of the difficult circumstances of the army, the commander said, “Anyone who wishes to go to Kim Il Sung’s army, step forward.”
At first, his men did not budge. This was natural because they did not know their commander’s real intention. He might have been wishing to ferret out pro-communist elements so as to deal with them one way\or the other.
Kim Myong Jun was the first to step forward. This was followed by many others. A pioneer can provide a solution to however difficult a problem. Kim Myong Jun was the pioneer. That is why I have loved him dearly ever since he came over to the People’s Revolutionary Army.
“It was Deputy Commander Choe Yun Gu who fanned my decision at that time,” Kim Myong Jun said in recollection of the event. “Although he said nothing, his glance encouraged me to act on my decision.”
The Independence Army was divided in consequence,\and they all wept.
The commander\and his deputy\and everyone else wept. What pain they must have suffered as the body of their fighting force was torn apart! With a promise to meet again when Korea became independent, the two groups left each other in different directions. One under Choe Yun Gu’s command came over to the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army,\and the other group of several dozen men under Kim Hwal Sok’s command moved towards Fenghuangcheng. The last armed force of Kukmin-bu, which had been fighting against the Japanese imperialists in southern Manchuria, was dissolved in this manner.
“We’ve made this long, roundabout way to come to you, Commander Kim Song Ju,” Choe Yun Gu said when he met me at Nanpaizi. “We could have taken a straighter route... but we were too doubting to do so.”
I praised himrom the bottom of my heart for his just action.
His action was a remarkable event that should be highlighted in the history of our national liberation struggle\and the history of the united-front movement in our country. It meant the triumph of the united-front policy that we had pursued consistentlyrom the early years of the anti-Japanese armed struggle; it was also the pinnacle of communist struggle to carry out the Ten-Point Programme of the ARF. The alliance of the two armies served as an example that should be followed by the communists\and nationalists.
The distinguished services rendered by Choe Chun Guk\and Choe Yun Gu in setting the example have their legitimate place in one page of the history of our national united-front movement\and in the annals of great national unity. That is why I still remember Choe Yun Gu. I can say that he was the forerunner of an alliance with communism who put it into practice, that he was a large-minded man. Based on this fact, the historians who deal with the anti-Japanese armed struggle must give prominence to his contribution when they write the history of the national united-front movement.
I would say that Choe Yun Gu’s coming over to our side provided the revolutionary movement with a link between my father’s generation\and his son’s generation.rom the point of view of his ideological trend, Choe Yun Gu belonged to my father’s generation. Most of his generation aspired after nationalism,\whereas ours supported communism. The patriots of the two generations, who considered communism\and nationalism to be diametrically opposed to each other, finally took the road of joint anti-Japanese struggle by transcending the differences in ideology.
Choe Yun Gu’s case proves that people of different ideas, religious beliefs\and political views will be fully able to unite\and live in harmony if they cherish true love for their country\and nation.
Later, Choe Yun Gu was admitted into the Communist Party. Fighting courageously in an important post as a staff officer for victory in the anti-Japanese revolution, he fell in a battle in Huadian County towards the end of 1938. I bitterly mourned his death, the death of my father’s comrade-in-arms\and my own comrade in the revolution. It is most regrettable that he did not see the day of liberation after paving the road to alliance with the communists.
Kim Hwal Sok, by contrast with Choe Yun Gu, was captured by the enemy on his way to Jiang Jie-shi,\and became unable to carry out his duty as the commander of the Independence Army. Sensing that he was going to Jiang with illusions about him, the Japanese imperialists snared him by sending their agent to him in the guise of Jiang Jie-shi’s special envoy. The agent showed him forged credentials signed allegedly by Jiang\and said that Generalissimo Jiang wanted an interview with him. Kim Hwal Sok, who was blinded with his hope of seeing Jiang, followed the spy rashly, without fully identifying the man. The spy thus lured him to the headquarters of his gendarmerie.
Kim Hwal Sok’s own sick, anti-communist\and sycophantic mind was the cause of his ruin.
Our nation’s history shows that sycophants\and anti-communists have, without exception, taken the road of treachery to the nation.
Sun Yat-sen, though a leader of bourgeois democratic revolution, was able to continue with revolution, enjoying supportrom the broad section of the population, because he cooperated with communists. Kim Ku marked a proud page in the nation’s history when he made a fresh start\and wentrom anti-communism to patriotic alliance with communism in his closing years. Had he taken the road of alliance with communists, Kim Hwal Sok, too, could have ended his life as a patriot loved by the people, instead of falling into a trap laid by the Japanese.
Whenever I meet people affected with the disease of anti-communism I point out to them that anti-communism will not only ruin them as individuals, but also lead them into treachery against the nation\and their fellow people. Going against the communists, who stand on the side of the people, amounts to going against the people. This is precisely the reason why alliance with communists means love for one’s country\and nation\and for one’s fellow people,\whereas anti-communism signifies treachery against one’s country, one’s nation\and one’s fellow people.
Kim Myong Jun, who followed Choe Yun Gu to the People’s Revolutionary Army, remained loyal to the revolution all along. After liberation he served as my adjutant for many years. He was honest\and simple\and assisted me a great deal by always being at my side.
Comrade Kim Jong Il puts him forward as an example\and looks after him well, saying that he is the last survivor of the Independence Army.
Hong Chun Su, too, came over to the People’s Revolutionary Armyrom the Independence Army.
The historical experience of the Independence Army force, which joined the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in the war of national liberation against the Japanese imperialist aggressors, eloquently proves that all the patriotic national forces in the north\and south of Korea\and abroad can\and must join efforts in the struggle against foreign forces by transcending differences in thought, ideas\and political views.
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