WORKING PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE WORLD, UNITE!

KIM IL SUNG

THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF

KOREA IS THE\orGANIZER OF

VICTORY IN THE FATHERLAND

LIBERATION WAR

Speech to the Teaching Staff\and Students

of the Central Party School under

the Workers’ Party of Korea

June 18, 1952

 Comrades,  

 Today I would like to speak to you about the policies\and leadership role assumed by our Party after the outbreak of the Fatherland Liberation War.

As soon as the Fatherland Liberation War broke out, our Party clearly defined the character of this war.  At first, we thought this war to be a civil war against the puppet Syngman Rhee clique. But a few days later when the US imperialists directly launched an armed intervention, the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee made it clear that this war was not simply a civil war but a Fatherland Liberation War against formidable foreign imperialist aggressors. For victory in the war we immediately formed the Military Commission, called upon the entire people to rise in arms\and expanded\and strengthened the People’s Army. At the same time, we appealed to the people throughout the world for backing\and supporting our people’s struggle.

  At the outbreak of the war, our People’s Army fought back the enemy’s invasion at one stroke\and, crossing the 38th parallel, advanced swiftly to the Raktong River sector. When the US imperialists   realized that they would not be able to conquer the Korean people easily, they further expanded the armed intervention by mobilizing vast military forces.

  Although we had successfully carried out the democratic reforms\and founded the Republic after liberation, we had no economic foundation\and defense capability as yet powerful enough to cope with US imperialism because our Republic was still young. Nevertheless, attacked by the enemy, we were obliged to fight him with all our forces.

  We issued\orders for a general mobilization\and considerably increased the People’s Army divisions.  But with an army\organized recently\and trained for a short period of time, it was impossible to repulse at once the powerful armed forces of the enemy with a history of hundreds of years of aggressive wars.

  In October 1950 we had to retreat to the area north of the Chongchon River.

  The temporary retreat was the most difficult period our Party had ever experienced during the Fatherland Liberation War. Our country was at stake faced with the alternative of becoming a colony of imperialism again\or not. In this grim period when the fate of our country was being decided the eyes of all the Korean people were turned to our Party\and the whole world was following us closely. If we pulled through this serious difficulty\and went over again to the counteroffensive, driving off the enemy, this would be a great demonstration of the strength of our people\and the mightiness of the democratic camp\and give a powerful impetus to the national-liberation struggle of the peoples in colonies\and dependent countries. But if we had succumbed to the difficulties\and surrendered to the US imperialists, the world would have said, “I thought as much. The United States is such a strong nation. How can so small a country as Korea stand up against it?”\and if we had failed to crush the  aggressive offensive of the enemy who indulged in  bravado\and bluster, the US imperialists would have  reckoned still more arrogantly that they could invade  China\and, furthermore, the Soviet\union, to say  nothing of Korea,\and gain world supremacy. So, we had to put up a vigorous stand\and valiantly beat off the enemy, thereby clearly demonstrating to the peoples of the world that the days were already past when the United States was at liberty to conquer small countries.

  During our temporary retreat our internal situation was very complex. In our Party there were some waverers\and there appeared a defeatist tendency, too.

 Taking advantage of the confusion, breaches of discipline\and\order appeared in the People’s Army.  Moreover, reactionaries who had wormed their way into the friendly parties committed the crime of murdering our Party members, who had failed to evacuate, in collaboration with the enemy in the areas seized by him.

In this grave situation the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee, with a view to tiding over the difficult situation, took the following steps.

  First, we decided that a counteroffensive against the enemy should be launched without fail\and that in this the initiative should be taken by the Koreans themselves. Even though we receive foreign aid, we ourselves should take the lead. Only when the master who receives aid plays the part of master well\and takes the lead, will the people who give aid feel themselves justified in doing so\and become enthusiastic\and come forward with greater fervour. In a labour-aid team, too, the villagers will not work with zeal if the master fails to play his role well.

  Second instructions were issued to put in\order rapidly the army units in retreat, strengthen discipline in the Party\and the People’s Army, combat the waverers more resolutely\and take stringent\organizational measures against them.

  We called the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee in\order to mobilize the entire Party\and all the people for the implementation of the decision of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee. Great successes were achieved by the plenary meeting which was held in a grave period when the fate of the country was being decided.

  The plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee confirmed the correctness of the policy adopted by the Political Committee,\and the entire membership of the Party gave unreserved support to the appeal\and decision of the Party Central Committee.

  Around the time when the plenary meeting was held, the People’s Army passed over to the counteroffensive\and liberated Pyongyang\and Seoul, the latter for the second time,\and advanced as far as the Suwon area. Then, the People’s Army units active behind enemy lines linked up with the main units.  During the second offensive our People’s Army dealt the enemy a shattering military blow.

  With the aim of further consolidating the great successes achieved by our people in the second offensive\and mobilizing the entire people for a new victory, the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee set forth the major fighting tasks for 1951 in accordance with the decision of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee.

  In general our Party’s instructions concerning the main lines of work for 1951 can be summarized as follows:

  First, the Party\and government bodies should be rapidly restored;

  Second, the People’s Army should be further expanded\and reinforced\and more branches of the technical service trained;

  Third, measures should be taken to stabilize the people’s life;

  Fourth, the struggle against the reactionaries should be intensified;

  Fifth, the work of inviting more foreign support\and aid should be improved;

  Sixth, the guerrillas behind enemy lines should be marshalled\and their activities stepped up.

  These lines, put forward by the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee for the purpose of carrying into practice the decisions of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee, were absolutely correct.

The Party took a number of important measures to strengthen the People’s Army. It dispatched members of the Political Committee of its Central Committee\and other cadres of the national level directly to the divisions\and frontline units to explain the Party’s line to the soldiers, boost their morale\and raise the officers’ commanding power. As a result, the morale of the army\and the commanding power of the officers rose markedly.

The formation of Party\organizations in the army units in keeping with the decision of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee was of special importance in strengthening the People’s Army.  With the formation of Party\organizations the hard-core  ranks of the army were further consolidated\and the  Party’s political leadership of the army units was  strengthened.

  The People’s Army grew in scope\and strength in terms of armament\and techniques, too. Today our People’s Army has MIG-15 fighters it did not have before 1950\and, accordingly, is capable of hitting hard the enemy not only on the ground but also in the air. All the artillery units were also put in\order in 1951,\and became more formidable than during the first counteroffensive. The units of other technical   branches were also further reinforced.

  Through countless operations the People’s Army has accumulated a wealth of fighting experience\and grown strongerrom the point of view of quality. At present our People’s Army units are capable of skillfully employing varied tactics such as offensives, position defense,\and guerrilla warfare.rom the point of view of numerical strength, too, the People’s Army has grown. Now our People’s Army will stand firm\and not fall back one step; it has the upper hand in battle.

  Simultaneously with the growth\and strengthening of the People’s Army, the guerrilla units in south Korea have been revitalized. The People’s Army soldiers who failed to retreat\and the guerrillas who stayed behind in the localities have linked up\and are active in many districts including the Mt Jiri area.

 The Party has also paid much attention to the rehabilitation of the dislocated economy, stabilization of the people’s life\and consolidation of the rear. It formed the committee for the relief of war victims\and carried on the work of relieving war sufferers on a wide scale. It set up schools for bereaved children of patriots\and\orphanages\and looked after the war\orphans while sending part of them to be brought up in fraternal countries. Owing to the poor distribution of goods, even salt was in short supply once, but now  we are in a position to provide salt\and rice even to the  mountain areas of Kangwon Province at any time. As you see, the positive steps taken by the Party have made the people’s life far more stable.

  The war played havoc with industry, but our Party mapped out a plan for national economic development in 1951\and mobilized the masses of working people for its successful implementation.

  We quickly rehabilitated the wrecked munitions factories\and resumed the production of submachine guns\and other small arms, mortars, shells\and bullets to be supplied to the People’s Army. In rehabilitating such industries as footwear, clothing\and textile which were severely damaged during the enemy bombing raids\and in\organizing the production, too, our Party overcame all manner of difficulties\and scored great successes.

  All other branches of the national economy, with the exception of capital construction, fulfilled their plans.

  In the field of agriculture, the Party ensured that sowing was on time in the spring of 1951. For this it  called a conference of active peasants, arranged short courses for the cadres of the ri Party cells\and people’s  committees\and ri branches of public\organizations \and did a good deal of\organizational work for the  spring sowing. Although the bombing raids by enemy planes were severe, Party members were the first to go out into the fields despite the danger\and led the peasants in farm work. This is to be applauded.

  In 1951 we made sustained efforts to further develop internationalist friendship\and cooperation with the fraternal countries,\and the support\and aid of the peoples of these countries to our people further increased.

  The year 1951 witnessed great success in the restoration\and consolidation of our Party\organizations, too.

  But our work in 1951 had shortcomings as well.  Mention should be made above all of the shortcomings manifested in the work of restoring\and consolidating the Party\organizations. The most serious shortcoming is that many officials carried out the Party’s line incorrectly. While restoring\and consolidating the Party\organizations they mechanically issued penalties against many Party members for reasons of Party membership cards.

  Since large numbers of Party members had been killed in the war, the Party ranks should have been replenished through the enrolment of patriots\and activists who had fought unflinchingly against the enemy during the retreat, but, rather, the doors of the Party were kept closed. As a result, the Party ranks were preventedrom being expanded. Such deviations were sharply criticized at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee. A resolute struggle was waged against such wrong tendencies,\and in consequence, the Party\organizations were fully restored\and consolidated\and the Party came to be further expanded\and developed\organizationally. (continued)