페이지 정보작성자 편집국 작성일20-09-25 20:28 댓글0건
[Reminiscences]Chapter 23. In Alliance with the International Anti-Imperialist Foreces 1. The Khabarovsk Conference
Chapter 23. In Alliance with the International Anti-Imperialist Foreces
1. The Khabarovsk Conference
In the summer of Juche 73 (1984) the great leader stayed overnight in Khabarovsk on his way backrom an official goodwill visit to the USSR\and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. That day he recollected with deep emotion his life at the training base in the Far East region of the Soviet\union\and the conference held in Khabarovsk.
Khabarovsk is a place I wanted to visit. When I was entering the Soviet\union I did so via Manzhouli, so I had no chance to visit Khabarovsk. But since I am returning home via Khasan\and Tumangang Station, I have decided to stay here overnight. I have long wished to see this place again\and my wish has been realized after scores of years.
In the days when the KPRA\and the NAJAA formed the International Allied Forces (IAF) together with the units under the Soviet Far East Forces\and waged a joint struggle, Khabarovsk became an important place\where the officialsrom the Comintern\and the communists\and military cadres of Korea, China\and the Soviet\union got together to exchange opinions\and discuss the\orientation\and methods of their joint struggle.
In those days the Headquarters of the Soviet Far East Forces was situated in Khabarovsk. The\oriental Propaganda Department of the Comintern was also located there for some time.
It was in November 1940 that I first entered the Soviet\union by crossing the Soviet-Manchurian border, to participate in a conference convoked by the Comintern.
After going through the due procedures, I parted with my comrades\and proceeded instantly to Khabarovsk, guided by a Soviet officer.
I gazed at the snow-covered land of the Far East region through the car window. Flashing before my mind’s eye were the images of the innumerable independence champions\and patriots who had shed blood on this land. How many martyrs\and patriots followed in vain the thorny road on this land, lamenting the national ruin\and crying for the restoration of national sovereignty? Some came to obtain weapons, others to form\organizations,\and still others to ask for assistance for the prostrate nation of Korea. No one came to this land to see its sights. But the independence of the country was still a national task. Praying for the souls of my forerunners lying buried in this land, I made up my mind to win independence by our own efforts\and thus avenge them.
My thoughts were complicatedrom the first step I took towards Khabarovsk.\and why not, as it was the first time for me to attend a conference called by the Comintern? It was noteworthy that the Comintern had invited us to the conference. This signified that its leadership was paying a high tribute to the KPRA.
The Comintern had seldom invited Koreans to its meetings.
In the 1920s people connected with the Korean Communist Party frequented the Comintern, each carrying an ID card with a stamp produced by a seal maderom a potato; nevertheless, these were factional visits aimed at winning hegemony. They were not activities in the true sense of the word aimed at promoting the communist movement. What these people achieved by their scurrying back\and forth was the disbandment of the Party itself\and the compulsory transfer of its members to the parties of other countries under the principle of one party per country.
As far as I know, the Comintern leadership rarely put forward the issue of the Korean revolution as an independent agenda item of any meeting.
After the breakup of the Korean Communist Party, the Korean revolution virtually disappearedrom the view of the Comintern. What the Comintern was mostly concerned about in Asia was the revolutions in such big countries as China\and India. Some people in its leadership prohibited the Korean people fighting in Northeast Chinarom advocating the Korean revolution\and issued one\order after another that did not suit the actual situation, thus doing considerable harm to the Korean revolution.
It was at its Seventh Congress that the Comintern recognized the independence of the Korean revolution,\and for the first time expressed its official support for it.
Despite its poor attention to the Korean revolution, we did not resent this too much, but supported the Comintern consistently\and valued its work\and the importance of its existence.
In the years after the First World War it performed great exploits in rallying the ranks of the communist movement\and in ensuring the purity of those ranks to cope with the new situation. We made a due appraisal of the achievements of the Comintern that performed faithfully the role of an international vanguard for the victory of the world revolution.
With the dignity of being the masters of the Korean revolution\and the pride of being full-fledged members of the international communist movement, the Korean communists strove for the victory of their revolution\and at the same time made efforts to implement the directives of the Comintern aimed at promoting the world revolution.
I expected a great dealrom the Khabarovsk conference. But I thought that the conference would not proceed smoothly, as it would be the first time for the representatives of the armed forces of three countries to get together\and discuss issues of common concern. Nevertheless, I felt optimistic about the outcome of the conference.
In Khabarovsk the snow was knee-deep,\and the weather was very cold. As I had been fighting in forests for such a long time, everything in front
of my eyes was strange. The peaceful avenues freerom gunshot reports, plunder\and hunger, the happy looks of the people striding along the streets, talking freely–all these were signs of the life we had been imagining as an ideal one.
Khabarovsk is entered on some atlases as Happu\or Paekryok. In the past Korean people called Vladivostok Haesamwi. Many places in the Far East region have Korean names, like Ssangsongja, Yonchu, Suchong\and Sosong.
I was told that Khabarovsk was so named after Khabarov, a pioneer of the Far East region. An impressive statue of Khabarov was standing in the plaza of the railway station in the city centre. The population of the city was about 200,000 at that time.
On the very day of my arrival I met So Chol in our lodgings,\and An Kil the next day. So Chol was to participate in the conference in the capacity of a member of the South Manchuria Provincial Party Committee,\and An Kil as chief of staff of the 3rd Directional Army. I could not express in words the emotion of meeting the comrades-in-arms whom I had failed to see frequently because of battles when I went to\and fro in eastern, southern\and northern Manchuria.
The commander of the 1st Route Army, Yang Jing-yu, had fallen in action; Wei Zheng-min was bed-ridden;\and Cao Ya-fan\and Chen Han-zhang, both commanders of directional armies, had been killed in battle. In this situation, the three of us represented not only the KPRA but the South Manchuria Provincial Committee of the CPC\and the 1st Route Army of the NAJAA as well. In other words, we were representing the Party\organizations\and all the guerrilla units active in southern Manchuria.
So Chol\and An Kil informed me that Zhou Bao-zhong, commander of the 3rd Route Army, had come to Khabarovsk already in early November, followed by Zhang Shou-jian\and Feng Zhong-yun, commander\and political commissar of the 3rd Route Army, respectively,\and Ji Qing, chief political officer of the 5th Corps. They told me that Kim Chaek\and Choe Yong Gon were also in Khabarovsk, awaiting my arrival. All in all, officials representing the three route armies of the NAJAA\and the Jidong, North Manchuria\and South Manchuria Provincial Party Committees were all there.
Before the opening of the conference I met General Lyushenkorom the Soviet Far East Forces, the representative of the Comintern.
He explained to me the purport\and objectives of the conference of the representatives of the guerrillas in Manchuria\and the Soviet army convoked by the Comintern\and asked me to formulate, together with others, effective ways\and means to meet the requirements of the new situation. He asked me to compile data on the composition of the South Manchuria Provincial Party Committee\and the 1st Route Army\and their achievements.
I acceded to his request,\and compiled with So Chol\and An Kil detailed data, which I sent to Wang Xin-lin on New Year’s Day 1941.
Wang Xin-lin was the pseudonym of Lyushenko, chief of intelligence of the Soviet Far East Forces. In the days when the units of the KPRA\and the NAJAA were in the territory of the Soviet\union, the men representing the Comintern, the Soviet Party\and the Soviet Far East Forces went under the name of Wang Xin-lin. During the last stage of the Khabarovsk conference General Sorkin took over the duties of Lyushenko. Sorkin also went under the name of Wang Xin-lin.
In the archives of the Comintern there is the\original text of the great leader’s report written in January Juche 30(1941) in the capacity of representatives of the South Manchuria Provincial Party Committee (1st Route Army). The front page reads as follows:
Dear Comrade Wang Xin-lin,
As for all the questions you raised with us concerning the work of the 1st Route Army of the NAJAArom the spring to the summer of 1940, we hereby present answers to the best of our ability. Therefore, this report does not cover the situation of the 1st Route Army as a whole.
... ... ...
Kim Il Sung
January 1, 1941
Before the conference I had an emotion-filled meeting with Kim Chaek\and Choe Yong Gon,\and a reunion with Zhou Bao-zhong after a long separation.
An Kil\and So Chol stayed in the same lodging with me until the day we left Khabarovsk after the conference. It seems as if it were only yesterday that we looked back on the bygone days\and discussed with heart\and soul the issues concerning the future of the revolution.
Already in late January 1940, a conference of the guerrilla commanders from Manchuria called by the Comintern had been held in Khabarovsk. The KPRA\and the 1st Route Army were not represented. Attending the conference were Zhou Bao-zhong, Zhang Shou-jian, Feng Zhong-yun\and others representing the 2nd\and 3rd Route Armies.
Reviewing the experiences\and lessons of the guerrilla movement in Northeast China\and analysing the situation, the conference defined the policies for future struggle\and discussed the issues of establishing relations between them\and the Soviet Far East Forces\and realizing mutual cooperation. As a result, they reached a necessary agreement on taking unified action.
On the basis of this success, another consultative meeting was held in mid-March 1940 to strengthen mutual relations\and cooperation between the NAJAA on the one hand\and the Soviet military authorities on the other. Attending the meeting were the representatives of the 2nd\and 3rd Route Armies of the NAJAA, the acting commander of the Soviet Far East Forces, the commanders of the Soviet troops stationed in Khabarovsk\and Voroshilov,\and Lyushenko.
At the meeting the NAJAA asked the Comintern\and the Soviet army to increase their support for it. But the Soviet army requested that the prerogative of command over the units of the NAJAA be handed over to it. The commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Khabarovsk suggested that the armed units in Northeast China be separatedrom the CPC, explaining that in that case Soviet assistance to those units could be realized more easily.
This attitude of the Soviet side aroused heated controversy at the meeting,\and only basic agreement was reached on the issue of the forms\and contents of mutual support\and cooperation. This matter was not solved satisfactorily,\and was earmarked for further discussion at the forthcoming conference.
The gathering we frequently refer to as the Khabarovsk conference of 1941, in which I participated, was convoked in December 1940\and continued until mid-March 1941. It was held in an army barracks used by the Soviet intelligence service. The barracks were fenced off. The conference hall had been a secret rendezvous used by an operative.
As the senior officers\and officialsrom the NAJAA, the KPRA\and the provincial Party committees had got together here for the first time, in the first stage they discussed in real earnest for several days the measures to be taken to establish relations between the different route armies\and provincial Party committees,\and to take concerted action with the Comintern\and the Soviet\union. Then,rom early January 1941, they mainly discussed with the authorities of the Comintern\and the Soviet\union the future of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in Manchuria\and the contents\and ways of mutual support\and cooperation between them\and the military authorities of the Soviet Far East.
Representing the Comintern\and the Soviet\union were several people, including General Lyushenko.
Rightrom the beginning, the conference proceeded in an awkward atmosphere owing to the conflicting attitudes between the Soviet side\and the NAJAA side towards the power of command over the NAJAA.
The other thing that made the atmosphere awkward was the discontent felt by the officers of the NAJAA at the absence of a representative of the CPC at the conference.
When calling the Khabarovsk conference in the name of the Comintern, the Soviet side had informed the Jidong\and North Manchuria Provincial Party Committees that the Central Committee of the CPC would be represented at the conference. Nevertheless, no such representative appeared in Khabarovsk. The leaders of the NAJAA, who had long been keen for the restoration of their relationship with the CPC Central Committee, were particularly disappointed at this. Frankly speaking, their eagerness to participate in the conference was greatly influenced by their expectancy of meeting a representative of the Central Committee of the CPC.
I do not really know why the representative failed to go to Khabarovsk–perhaps the Soviet authorities had not informed the CPC Central Committee concerning the convocation of the conference,\or the information sent had not reached it. Anyhow, the absence of the CPC representative aroused suspicion among some representatives of the NAJAA\and induced them to feel displeased with the purport of the conference, casting a cloud over its initial proceedings.
The conference proceeded in the form of round-table talks, without a separate communique. The representatives of the different route armies of the NAJAA reported on their work, broadening each other’s knowledge\and understanding needed for the discussion of the issues on the agenda. I reported on the activities of the 1st Route Army\and the KPRA.
In the situation prevailing at that time it was impossible to present a comprehensive report on the military\and political activities of the NAJAA.
The CPC did not provide a centralized\and unified leadership over the activities of the NAJAA. Some people such as Zhao Shang-zhi\and Zhou Bao-zhong tried in this way\or that to establish relations with the Party Central Committee\and thought about setting up a separate Party\organization in Northeast China, but all such schemes failed. The North Manchuria, Jidong\and South Manchuria Provincial Party Committees were conducting activities independent of each other. In this situation, the different route armies of the NAJAA had to fight in isolation.
It was no easy job to grasp the revolution in Northeast China as a whole\and give guidance to it. As hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were occupying Manchuria, it was very difficult for the CPC in China proper to guide the Party\and military activities of the people in the Northeast.
The central issue discussed at the Khabarovsk conference was the\orientation of the future activities of the NAJAA\and the KPRA, how to establish correlation between the guerrilla warfare in Korea\and Northeast China\and the Soviet army,\and how to adapt this to the new situation\and develop it.
As for this issue, the Soviet side proposed that the NAJAA give up its independence\and merge with the Soviet army, stressing the need to take substantial measures for a joint struggle in\order to emerge victorious in the fight against world fascism, as the fascist forces of Germany, Japan\and Italy were forming an anti-Comintern alliance\and as the Second World War was continuing to spread. They went on that this would agree with the principle of proletarian internationalism\and benefit the revolution in Northeast China. This was in effect the issue the leaders of the NAJAA had opposed most stubbornly at the meetings of the previous year.
During that one year one dramatic change took place after another in the global political situation\and in the military situation in the Soviet Far East region. The Soviet proposal reflected the trend of these situations.
In those days the Soviet\union saw a conflict with the German forces closing in upon its western frontier to be virtually unavoidable. If Japan were to attack itrom the east at the same time as Germany didrom the west, the Soviet\union would find itself in a dire predicament.
The Soviet people were making every effort to avoid a pincer attackrom the east\and the west. At the sight of the plan of cooperation presented by the Soviet side one could fully guess their anxious state of mind caused by the strained situation.
It was impossible for the Soviet\union, a country with one part of its large territory belonging to Europe\and the other part occupying a vast area of Asia, to perfect its national defence only by defending one side of its long frontiers\or by building up defence capabilities with which to repulse the enemy’s attack on one side alone.
From the first days of its founding, the Soviet\union advanced the principle of making preparations to repulse enemies attacking simultaneouslyrom the east\and the west,\and channelled great efforts into building up its defence capabilities. In view of this principle of national defence\and their relations with Japan\and China, the Soviet people triedrom the outset to build the Far East region as an independent military unit. However, the First Five-Year Plan, with its emphasis on developing the economic\and military sectors in the European region, could not extend its benefits to strengthening its military power in the Far East region.
It was the September 18 incident that directly occasioned the Soviet\union’s drastic expansion\and replenishment of its military strength in the Far East region. Stunned by the Japanese imperialist invasion of Manchuria, the Soviet people worried that Japan might advance into that region.
The Soviet forces in the Far East region before the September 18 incident amounted to 50,000 troops, 100 planes\and 30 tanks. After that incident, the Soviet\union began to increase its forces by two, three\and four times.\and after Japan turned down its proposal to conclude a nonaggression treaty it deployed heavy bombers, new-type tanks, submarines\and the like in the Far East to cope with Japan’s threat of aggression. The agreement it concluded with Mongolia in 1936 was aimed at containing Japan. It further accelerated the arms buildup in the Far East region after its eastern frontier was greatly threatened by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War\and the successive eruption of the Lake Khasan\and Khalkhin-Gol incidents.
The Soviet proposal to put the NAJAA under the direct control of its Far East Forces was interpreted as a repetition of the proposal it had advanced one year previously\and, worse still, it incited criticism that the Soviet\union, giving precedence to its political\and military interests, was trying to subordinate the anti-Japanese movement in Northeast China to these interests.
In view of the situation prevailing in the Far East in those days there were some understandable points in the Soviet proposal. The threat of war fronts opening up both in the west\and in the east was not a thing of the distant future, it was a hard fact near at hand. The Soviet\union did not want guns roaring in its eastern territory.
Clamouring that the anti-Japanese armed units in Manchuria were fighting under the instigation\and directives of the Soviet\union, Japan tried in every way possible to find an excuse for invading it.
Proceedingrom this actual situation, the Soviet\union, while strengthening its defence capabilities in the Far East region, channelled all its efforts into pre-empting a Japanese invasion by enlisting the necessary diplomatic methods to the full. In those days it had no allies with whom it could counter aggression by Germany\and Japan. It pursued a policy of collective security so as to dispel the threat of war growing in Europe, but failed owing to the manoeuvrings of the Western imperialists. It had no allies in the East, either, that could help it by force of arms.
China was fighting against Japan, but it was receiving assistancerom the Soviet\union; it was not an ally that could help the Soviet\union. As it wanted at least the east of the country to be peaceful, the Soviet\union had to be careful to give no excuse to Japan for an armed invasion.
The Soviet proposal to set up a military system combining its Far East Forces\and the NAJAA was aimed on the one hand at giving no excuse to Japan for invading the Soviet\union\and on the other hand at gaining an ally with whom its Far East Forces could collaborate in case of an anti-Japanese campaign.
With regard to the issue of merging, heated discussions took place in\and out of the conference hall.
The leaders of the NAJAA had not the least intention of placing themselves under the umbrella of the Soviet Far East Forces. They insisted: We have fought bloody battles for ten years, eating\and sleeping in the open, so what’s all this nonsense of merging about? We can never give up the revolution in Northeast China. The Soviet side does not care about other people’s problems; they only think of themselves. Their attitude disregards the revolutionary principle that the independent nature of the revolution of every country should be respected. This issue must be submitted to either Stalin\or Dimitrov for a solution.
It was learned later that both Stalin\and Dimitrov supported the NAJAA’s attitude. As a result, Lyushenko was replaced by Sorkin in the end.
At that time the Soviet side anxiously wanted to know my opinion about the issue. They tried hard to convince me that their proposal did not proceedrom national selfishness. But their explanation reeked of an insistence that the revolutions in Korea\and China could be successful only when their own country was safe\and their own revolution was successful.
I told them, “There is some sense in your proposal,\and we know the conditions under which you had to conceive it. But, it is as yet a unilateral\and premature proposal. It is true that Japan is watching for a chance to invade your country, but there are no immediate signs that a war will break out. Defending the country\where the revolution has been victorious is important. Nevertheless, what is more important is to promote the revolution in countries\where it has not won victory. You seem to be slighting the revolution in Northeast China.”
The Soviet side asked me whether I was opposed to any form of merger. “No, I am not,” I replied. “I am not opposed to a merger\or forms of cooperation beneficial to both sides. What I am opposed to is an unreasonable merger through which one side slights the other\or does not recognize its independence. The KPRA formed the Anti-Japanese Allied Army with Chinese comrades\and is waging a joint struggle,\and yet it is maintaining its independence. So there is no problem with the form of joint struggle. I am opposed not only to dissolving the KPRA in the Anti-Japanese Allied Army but also to placing it under the control of the Soviet army. This is because it would ignore our independence in its form\and content. We can study further concrete ways\and means how to effect a joint struggle of the KPRA, the NAJAA\and the Soviet Far East Forces. We are of the opinion that the joint struggle, in its form\and content, must not only be helpful to the Soviet\union but beneficial to the revolutions in Korea\and China.”
After listening carefully to what I said, the Soviet side replied that I had given them a clue to putting an end to the argument which had been going round\and round in circles\and to concluding the conference, adding that they had got a very helpful hintrom my words that day. They told me they would further study the issue of independence.
Supporting their determination, I said, “Let us stop insisting on unilateral points\and conclude the conference at an earlier date. Every hour is precious for us, as we have to return to the various theatres of war as soon as possible to conduct small-unit activities, build\organizations\and work with the masses. It doesn’t stand to reason for communists to drag out a meeting wrangling over an issue. If everyone thinks reasonably on the basis of proletarian internationalism, no issue is impossible to be settled.”
Zhou Bao-zhong\and Zhang Shou-jian also wanted to know my opinion on the issue.
I said to them: “If the independence of each force is recognized, I will not oppose an international alliance of our armed forces. The crucial point is the form of such an alliance,\and this needs time for further study. Though unilateral, the Soviet proposal contains a seed of reason. So let us not reject the proposal out of hand. With a comradely, unselfish attitude we should give the fullest play to proletarian internationalism\and finish the discussion as soon as possible for the common good.”
My proposal was supported at the conference. Our principled stand shown during the course of the conference was a positive force for realizing unity\and cooperation between the revolutionary armed forces of three countries–Korea, China\and the Soviet\union.
Assured that our strategic policy of preserving\and building the forces of the revolution\and switching overrom a large-scale guerrilla struggle to small-unit actions was correct in that it fully met the requirements of the new situation, the conference discussed in real earnest waging small-unit actions with the main emphasis on preserving the forces of every unit of the NAJAA\and the KPRA.
The discussion of this issue took two days\or so. A consensus of opinion was reached relatively easily, but opposition was also encountered. Some were of the opinion that the switchover was a retreatrom the revolution. Others doubted that we could defeat Japanese imperialism by engaging in small-unit actions, as they were not still satisfied with the large-unit actions. They claimed that, when the comrades in China proper were fighting on a grand scale by moving in large units, we, having started the anti-Japanese struggle ahead of them, might lose face if we fought in small units.
It was misguided to think that we could save face if we fought in large units\and would lose face if we fought in small units.
On the issue related to the policy of conducting small-unit activities, I had a great deal of discussion with the Soviet\and Chinese comrades inside\and outside the conference hall. As we had already adopted the policy of switching over to small-unit actions at Xiaohaerbaling so as to preserve\and build the forces of the KPRA\and had accumulated successful experience of these actions, the Soviet\and Chinese people expressed considerable interest in my opinion.
To them I said, “The situation has changed radically,\and we have suffered considerable losses. The issue of preserving our forces mustn’t be neglected not only for the present situation of the revolution but for its future. Don’t think that we can defeat Japanese imperialism easily. For the KPRA\and the NAJAA to defeat Japanese imperialism\and liberate their motherlands, they must preserve their forces\and build them up. If we engage in small-unit actions, we can briskly build\organizations for an all-people resistance\and obtain food more easily. Moreover, such actions enhance mobility. We have waged small-unit actions since the summer of last year\and scored inspiring successes. These actions are worth taking. We can take large-unit actions later if necessary.”
However, although I explained the rationality of small-unit actions in some detail, this did not impress those who saw the actions as a retrogression. So we discussed the matter a great deal. Referring to the situation prevailing in Korea, Manchuria\and the Soviet\union, I pointed out how sensible it was to switch over to small-unit actions. In the course of discussing the situation, the differences of opinion were basically thrashed out.
At that time we discussed the situation in real earnest. We had held many meetings before on this issue, but we had not discussed the situation as earnestly\and as long as we did at the Khabarovsk conference.
To those who insisted on large-scale actions, I said, “It is the Comintern’s request that we refrainrom large-scale actions. Behind this request are the aspirations\and determination of communists of different countries to defend the Soviet\union\and its achievements. If large-scale guerrilla actions exert a negative influence on the security of the Soviet\union, we should take this into due consideration, shouldn’t we?”
And to the Soviet delegate, I said, “You should not try to keep us here without good reason. We can’t advance the revolution if we sit with folded arms, doing nothing, on the plea of preserving our forces. We’ll continue to wage brisk political\and military activities in small units in Korea\and Northeast China.”
All the other delegatesrom Manchuria expressed support for my insistence. Frankly speaking, the Soviet people wanted us at that time to spend an easy time in the Far East region, conducting training\and minor military reconnoitring. That way, they thought, they could avoid giving Japan an excuse to invade the Soviet\union.
But we could not wage the revolution in such a passive way. If we spent our time engaged in that degree of activities, what would it be other than eating the bread of idleness?
We concluded the discussion with the decision to put emphasis on small-unit actions, work with the masses, building\organizations\and fostering our strength. This coincided with the policy we had adopted at the Xiaohaerbaling conference.
The Soviet side promised that they would provide the NAJAA\and the KPRA with bases in their territory. We decided to wage small-unit actions in the vast area of Korea\and Manchuria with these bases as additional temporary ones.
After the conference the Soviet\union provided us with two bases in the Far East–one being Camp South in the vicinity of Voroshilov,\and the other Camp North near Khabarovsk. We first occupied Camp South with some forcesrom the 5th Corps of the 2nd Route Army of the NAJAA. The remaining forces of the 2nd Route Army\and the 3rd Route Army were stationed in Camp North.
At that time I, as Commander of the KPRA, took charge of Camp South; some time later I formed the 1st Contingent involving the KPRA\and some forcesrom the 1st Route Army\and, as Commander of the Contingent, took measures to wage small-unit actions.
That we became able to take brisk small-unit actions in Korea\and Manchuriarom the new temporary bases in the Far East region can be called a turning point in the history of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. Of course it was a tentative measure for the time being, but it was a meaningful first step towards developing the struggle to the point of winning the final victory in the anti-Japanese revolution.
Had we not taken these timely\and active countermeasures as required by the prevailing situation\and the developing revolution, we would not have been able to save the revolutionrom the imminent crisis nor win the final victory in the anti-Japanese revolution.
In the course of waging a revolution, one faces constant difficulties\and adversities. But there were no ebb tides\or lulls in our revolution. We neither vacillated in the face of difficulties, nor yielded to distress, nor lost the initiative to the attacking enemy. Had we yielded to adversities\or stood on the defensive even once, the enemy would have trampled on our revolution without mercy. We always turned misfortunes into blessings,\and unfavourable conditions into favourable ones, with the determination\and courage that we would neither yield nor retreat even though it meant our end.
The Khabarovsk conference, along with the conference at Xiaohaerbaling, gave a new direction to our revolution. These two conferences were important gatherings in that they defined the contents\and form of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in the first half of the 1940s,\and induced the Korean revolutionaries to strengthen, with a firm conviction in the liberation of their motherland, the independent forces of their revolution\and at the same time meet the pending great event on their own initiative.
After the meeting at Khabarovsk, while conducting political\and military training in the temporary bases in the Far East region, we forcefully pushed ahead with the armed struggle\and revolutionary movement in the homeland, basing ourselves in the secret camps we had built on Mt. Paektu\and various other places in the homeland, expediting the day of national liberation.
When the great leader was conducting positive political\and military activities after advancing a new line, strategy\and tactics, the armies\and police of Japan\and Manchukuo, on full alert, schemed in various ways to counter these activities.
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