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작성자 편집국 작성일20-05-29 16:14 댓글0건관련링크
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[Reminiscences]Chapter 4 3. The Kalun Meeting
3. The Kalun Meeting
In late June our comrades began to gather in Kalun as prearranged. We already had revolutionary\organizations in Kalun. In 1927 we had realized the need to make a base at a traffic junction which afforded easy access to the different parts of Manchuria\and began to send hardcore elements of the Young Communist League to the area to explore it.
We decided to hold a meeting in Kalun, in view of the fact that the place was easy of access\and that it was a secluded base that ensured secrecy\and the safety of those attending the meeting.
Kalun was frequented by the champions of the anti-Japanese movement, but it was not exposed to the enemy. The place was ideal for holding a meeting because the people there had volunteered to aid us.
On arriving at Kalun I found that Jong Haeng Jong, head of the Children’s Expeditionary Corps, was waiting for me at the station. When I went to Kalun, he always came to meet me at the station\and accompany me.
On my arrival I found that the atmosphere in Kalun was somewhat calmer than in Dunhua\and Jilin. The May 30 Uprising having just finished, the atmosphere in Jiandao was very serious. The situation became more tense with the imminent dispatch of the Japanese troops to east Manchuria. The Japanese imperialists were intending to send their troops to Jiandao to suppress the rapidly-spreading revolutionary movement there, occupy Manchuria\and Mongolia\and secure a bridgehead for their invasion of the Soviet\union. With this aim Lieutenant General Kawashima, commander of the 19th Division of the Japanese army stationed in Ranam, was on a tour of inspection of the Longjing, Yanji, Baicaogou\and Toudaogou areas. At the same time the chief of staff of the Kuomintang troops in Jilin\and the civil administrator were on a tour of inspection in east Manchuria.
It was during this period that the revolutionary\organizations in the Jiandao area appealed to the people to drive out the lieutenant general of the Japanese army, the chief of staff of the Kuomintang troops\and the civil administrator rom east Manchuria.
On that visit to Kalun I stayed at the houses of Ryu Yong Son\and Jang So Bong, teachers at Jinmyong School.
Jang So Bong taught the children at Jinmyong School\and at the same time worked as the branch manager of the newspaper Tong-A Ilbo. Like Cha Kwang Su he was a well-informed, good writer\and carried out his duties with credit. So he was loved by his comrades.
A blot on his character was that he often quarrelled with his wife. When his comrades offered him advice, he complained that she was too feudalistic. Time\and again I tried to persuade him\and I criticized him so that he took an interest in his family life, but it was of little avail.
Jang So Bong was arrested by the police when he went to Changchun to buy weapons after the formation of the Korean Revolutionary Army\and became a turncoat. He is said to have undertaken “submission work” against me.
Kim Hyok\and Jang So Bong had rendered particularly distinguished service in making Kalun revolutionary. Pooling their efforts with the public-spirited men of the locality, they had set up schools\and evening schools, launched an enlightenment movement centred on these schools, reformed the enlightenment\organizations such as the peasants association, youth league, children’s association\and women’s society into revolutionary\organizations such as the Peasants\union, the Anti -Japanese Youth League, the Children’s Expeditionary Corps\and the Women’s Association respectively. They also trained people rom all walks of life to work for the anti-Japanese revolution.
It was in Kalun that magazine Bolshevik had been founded under Kim Hyok’s auspices.
In Kalun I continued to speculate on the path for the Korean revolution as I had done in Sidaohuanggou. Sorting out\and reviewing what I had been thinking for the past month, I wrote it down,\and this became a long article.
I wrote the article with the keen realization of the urgent need of the national liberation struggle in our country for a new guiding theory.
Without a new guiding theory the revolution could not advance even a single step forward.
The revolutionary advance of the oppressed people demanding independence made further strides in the 1930s on a worldwide scale. Asia was the continent in which the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples against the imperialists was fiercest.
Asia became the central arena of the national liberation struggle in the colonies because in those years the imperialists more openly intensified their aggression to wrest concessions rom the developing countries of Asia\and because the people of many Asian countries fought bravely in the struggle to safeguard their national independence.
No force could check the Eastern people’s just struggle to drive out the foreign forces\and live in a new society which was free\and democratic.
The revolutionary tide raged furiously in China, India, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia\and other Asian countries as the revolution advanced in the Soviet\union\and Mongolia. Around this time weavers in India, which had attracted the attention of the world for her non-violent resistance movement, held demonstrations in the streets under a red banner.
The Chinese people greeted the 1930s in the flames of a second civil war.
The revolutionary struggle in China\and many other Asian countries\and the active struggle of the people in the homeland greatly excited\and inspired us.
We became convinced that if a party was founded\and the right guiding theory was advanced it would be fully possible to rouse the people\and emerge victorious in the struggle against the Japanese imperialists.
In this period, too, in the arena of the national liberation struggle of Korea there appeared different isms\and doctrines representing the stands\and interests of different parties\and groups that would lead the masses this way\or that. None of these theories was free rom time\and class\limitations.
We deemed the armed struggle of the Independence Army to have been the highest form of the national liberation struggle up to that time. This struggle was participated in by the most active anti-Japanese independence champions rom the Left wing of the nationalist movement\and patriots. They had formed the Independence Army\and launched an armed struggle because they believed that only by fighting a war of independence was it possible to win back the country.
Some people thought that it was possible to win independence only through the military action of large troops\and other people maintained that the best way to drive out the Japanese imperialists was to employ terrorist tactics, while some others said that the strategy suited to the actual situation in Korea was to preserve some well -trained troops\and achieve independence in cooperation with the Soviet\union, China, the United States\and the like once they were at war with Japan. All these arguments presupposed a bloody fight against the Japanese imperialists.
But in its struggle the Independence Army had neither the scientific tactics\and strategy for pursuing its initial aims to the end nor a strong\and seasoned leadership capable of fighting the war to the end nor a firm mass foundation capable of supporting the army with manpower, materials\and finance.
Among the reformist arguments An Chang Ho’s “theory on preparation” called “the theory on the cultivation of strength” was much talked about by the independence champions.
We respected An Chang Ho as an honest\and conscientious patriot who devoted his life to the independence movement but we did not sympathize with his theory.
The Shanghai Provisional Government’s line of a non-violent independence movement did not receive the support\and sympathy of the masses. Some time after its formation the Shanghai Provisional Government disappointed people because it wasted time, constantly resorting to the diplomatic policy of non-violence which provided no hope. So, the Independence Army which held the military line to be supreme gave it the cold shoulder.
Syngman Rhee’s petition asking the League of Nations to place Korea under its mandatory administration did not deserve to be called a line of any sort. The “self-government” idea advanced by the right wing of the nationalists was a wild dream which went against the national spirit of independence.
The Korean Communist Party, founded in 1925, ended its existence without working out the scientific tactics\and strategy suited to the actual situation in Korea.
Generally speaking, the common weak point of the strategies\and lines of the preceding generation was that they did not believe in the strength of the masses\and turned away rom them.
The movement champions rom the preceding generation all ignored the fact that the people are the masters of the revolution\and the motive force of the revolution. Only by drawing on the\organized strength of millions of people was it possible to overthrow Japanese imperialism, but the champions of our anti-Japanese movement thought that the revolution\and the war of independence were conducted by a few special people alone.
Proceeding rom this viewpoint, those who were allegedly engaged in the communist movement founded a party by proclaiming the party centre to be composed of a few people rom the higher levels of society without laying any foundation to speak of. They were divided into groups in such a way as to form parties of three\and groups of five\and became involved in a scramble for hegemony over several years.
The line\and strategy of the preceding generation had the serious drawback that they were not firmly rooted in the Korean reality.
I decided that in\order to work out a correct guiding theory suited to the Korean reality it was necessary to take an independent view of all problems\and settle them in an\original way that was suited to our own specific situation, instead of holding classic works\or the experiences of other countries supreme. It would not do to copy the experience of the October Revolution on the plea of providing a guiding theory\or to sit back with folded arms, expecting that the Comintern would provide a recipe for success.
“We believe in the strength of the masses alone. Let us believe in the strength of our 20 million people\and, uniting them, let us wage a bloody war against the Japanese imperialists!” This cry came often rom the bottom of my heart.
Urged by this impulse, I tried to enunciate the idea we now call Juche in a draft report. What I intended to write in that draft report concerned the serious problems facing our revolution.
I gave a particularly great deal of thought to the question of the armed struggle.
In my draft report I put it forward as the basic line of the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle, as the foremost task for the Korean communists, to wage a comprehensive anti-Japanese war.
It took a long time to decide upon the armed struggle\and to fix it as our line. Before it was adopted as a line at Kalun, we were virtually empty -handed. I proposed that if an armed struggle was to be launched, the young communists should found a new type of army.
At that time some people were of a different opinion,\and said, “Since the Independence Army is already in existence, it will suffice to join it\and fight. Is there any necessity to found a separate army? We fear that the anti-Japanese military forces will be divided.”
Since the Independence Army had become Rightist\and reactionary, it was irrational\and impossible to renovate it rom within\and take military action.
In 1930 the strength of the Independence Army was insufficient. The strength of the Independence Army under Kukmin-bu was only nine companies. Even they were divided into the Kukmin-bu group\and the anti-Kukmin-bu group due to a split at the higher levels.
The Kukmin-bu group was the conservative force which stuck fast to the line the Independence Army had adhered to for over ten years. The anti- Kukmin-bu group was a new force which opposed the old line\and pursued a new line. People rom the anti-Kukmin-bu group even attempted to join hands with the communists, claiming to sympathize with communism. The Japanese imperialists named them the “third force” in the sense that they were not nationalists\or communists but a new middle-of-the-road force. The appearance of this “third force” of the anti-Kukmin- bu group within the nationalist movement proved that the trend to switch the nationalist movement to a communist movement had entered the stage of implementation. The strength of the Independence Army was reduced due to the antagonism between the Kukmin-bu group\and the anti-Kukmin-bu group,\and the nationalist movement was thrown into confusion.
The companies of the Independence Army were generally stationed in villages on the plain, but this did not favour guerrilla warfare. It did not have enough equipment, its discipline was loose\and its training was at a low level. On top of this, its relations with the inhabitants were not very good.
The Independence Army was on a gradual decline since its golden days in the early 1920s when it had mowed down large troops of Japanese at the battle of Qingshanli4\and the battle of Fengwugou5.
When I went to Wangqingmen to attend the conference of the General Federation of Korean Youth in South Manchuria, I talked with Hyon Muk Kwan about Kukmin-bu\and asked him, “Are you sure that you can defeat Japan with the strength of Kukmin-bu?” I raised this question to goad him because he boasted a lot about Kukmin-bu.
“If we fight on like this\and if the great powers help us, we will win our independence.”
I was disappointed at his reply. I wondered how an army which was fighting blindly without confidence in victory, turning to the great powers for help, could prove its worth. So I said to him by way of a joke, “Will the people of Kukmin-bu hand all their weapons over to us? If they do we will drive out the Japanese in three\or four years.”
This was before the terrorist outrages were committed against the members of the preparatory committee for the meeting, so I could afford to joke. Hyon Muk Kwan had always taken my jokes well since my Jilin days.
He made a wry smile but didn’t reply. He must have thought that I was indulging in idle dreams.
It was difficult to maintain the status quo in the army of Kukmin-bu. So, we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to form a new type of army.
I was convinced that an armed struggle led by communists alone could wage a thorough anti-Japanese war of resistance\and be revolutionary. This was because communists alone could rally in their armed ranks workers, peasants\and other broad sections of the anti-Japanese patriotic forces\and lead the Korean revolution as a whole to victory, taking charge of\and waging the noble war by employing scientific tactics\and strategies which would accurately reflect the interests of the masses.
The Japanese imperialists we would have to overthrow were a newly-emerging military power that had, in the Sino-Japanese War\and the Russo-Japanese War, easily defeated great powers with territories tens of times larger than that of Japan.
It would be no easy matter to defeat this power\and win back the country.
To overthrow Japanese imperialism meant to defeat the military power of Japan, which had received universal recognition. It meant to overpower the fanatical Japanese spirit\and to emerge victorious in a war of attrition against Japan, a country which had been accumulating manpower, materials\and financial power for nearly 70 years since the Meiji Restoration.
But we thought that if we waged an armed struggle for three\or four years we could defeat Japan. It was an idea which no one except hot-blooded young people could conceive. If the Japanese warlords had heard of this, they would surely have thrown their heads back\and burst out laughing.
If we are asked what guarantee we had for our judgment, we have nothing to say. What guarantee could we, with empty hands, have?
We had only patriotism\and young blood. We said three\or four years not because we made light of the strength of Japan but because we thought that our patriotism was stronger\and we were righteous. Our guarantee was the strength of our twenty million people. We were convinced that if we trained the twenty million people well\and induced them to rise in a struggle everywhere\and beat the Japanese troops\and police we could win our independence.
So, we thought that if an armed struggle was to be waged on a grand scale a firm mass foundation should be laid.
That is how the idea of the anti-Japanese national united front came into being.
I first felt the necessity for an\organization in my Hwasong Uisuk School days,\whereas it was at the time of the March First Popular Uprising that I first felt the strength of the nation\and engraved it in my heart. It was in my Jilin days that I decided to go deep among the people, rally them\and make the revolution by depending on their strength.
Without nationwide resistance through the enlistment of the twenty million people it would be impossible to shake off the yoke of colonial slavery. We maintained that in the pure class struggle the workers\and the peasant masses alone could be the motive force of the revolution, but since by its nature the Korean revolution was a revolution against feudalism\and imperialism not only the workers\and peasants but also the young people\and students, intellectuals, patriotic-minded men of religion,\and non-comprador capitalists could be the motive force of the revolution. Ours was the principle of rallying\and enlisting all the anti-Japanese patriotic forces interested in national liberation.
When we advanced this line, some people shook their heads dubiously, saying that no such definition could be found in the classics. They said it was a wild dream that communists should be allied with the social classes other than the workers\and peasants\and that they could not join hands with religious men\or the entrepreneur class. Proceeding rom this point of view the Tuesday group6 removed Kim Chan rom the post of head of the Manchuria general bureau of the Korean Communist Party simply because he had been associated with some people rom Kukmin-bu.
Many nationalists gave communists the cold shoulder. Nationalism was a taboo within the communist movement, while communism was a taboo within the nationalist movement. This tendency resulted in the division of the nation’s forces into the two camps of communists\and nationalists.
Sensible people were all pained at this state of affairs. Through their efforts, however, a movement for collaboration between the two camps of the communists\and nationalists was launched in the mid-20s,\and this resulted in the founding of the Singan Association in 1927. All the people warmly welcomed it as an indication that the communists\and nationalists could unite for the cause of the nation, although they had different ideas.
But the association had to proclaim its dissolution in 1931 due to the ceaseless destructive manoeuvres of the Japanese imperialists\and the subversive activities of the reformists who were corrupted\and used by them.
If the two forces had united firmly in the great cause of patriotism, the association would not have been so easily destroyed even if there had been subversion within\and without.
We greatly regretted the end of the collaboration between the communists\and nationalists with the dissolution of the Singan Association. If ideas alone were held supreme without priority being given to the nation, genuine collaboration could not be attained. It was my view in those days that if top priority was given to national liberation it was possible to join hands with any social class.
Proceeding rom this standpoint we collaborated, after liberation, with Kim Ku who had opposed communism all his life\and now are appealing for great national unity. If great national unity is attained, there will remain only the foreign forces\and traitors to the nation as obstacles.
When Choe Hong Hui\and Choe Tok Sin7 visited Pyongyang, although they had passed their lives at the anti-communist front with their guns turned on us, we welcomed them out of compatriotic love without caring about their past because great national unity was our supreme task as well as our policy.
I said to Choe Tok Sin, “Whether one lives in the north\or in the south, one must consider the question of reunification with top priority given to the nation. Only when the nation exists are there social classes\and isms, don’t you think? What is the use of communism, nationalism\or a belief in ‘God’ without the nation?” When we elaborated the line of the anti-Japanese national united front in Kalun over 60 years ago, we made the same appeal.
Politics must be comprehensive\and statesmen, broad-minded. If politics is not comprehensive, it cannot embrace all the people. If statesmen are not broad-minded, the people turn away rom them.
In my draft report I dwelt on the founding of the party, the character\and tasks of the Korean revolution,\and the basic standpoint for Korean communists to adhere to in struggle.
When I had prepared the draft report, I immediately submitted it for discussion to the leading cadres of the Young Communist League\and the AIYL who had come rom different places to attend the Kalun Meeting. In those days we held discussions at the edge of the field\or in the willow grove by the River Wukai in the daytime while we worked in the field,\and in the evening reviewed the opinions raised in the daytime in the night-duty room of Jinmyong School. During the mass discussions many opinions concerning interesting practical problems were offered.
At first a dispute arose as to how to define the character of the Korean revolution. The definition of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution given in the draft report provoked a heated debate. The focus of the debate was whether a new definition of the character of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution which was not found in the classics\and which had not been advanced in any other country conflicted with universal principles\and the law of the revolution\or not. According to the understanding of the young people of those days, bourgeois\and socialist revolutions were the only revolutions which brought about a radical change in modern history. So, they were fully justified in questioning a new concept of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution which was neither a socialist nor a bourgeois revolution.
We characterised the Korean revolution as an anti- imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution on the basis of the conclusion we had formed concerning the class relations prevailing in our country\and the tasks facing our revolution. The most urgent revolutionary task for the Korean nation was to overthrow Japanese imperialism, eliminate the feudal relations shackling our people\and effect democracy in our country. Hence we defined the Korean revolution as an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution.
If one squeezes the definition of the revolution into another pattern, one will be guilty of dogmatism. It is not the pattern that is most important but the actual situation. Communists should accept without hesitation a scientific definition suited to the actual situation in the country even if it is not found in the classics\or elsewhere. This represents a creative attitude towards Marxism-Leninism.
When I thus explained why I had defined the Korean revolution as an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution, the delegates said that they understood\and warmly supported it.
The question of the anti-Japanese national united front was most hotly debated. In those days it was publicly recognized as a difficult problem in both theory\and practice, a problem of which an open discussion was troublesome. People around us approached the question cautiously because some people rom the Comintern indiscriminately qualified those who supported the united front policy as reformists, citing the failure of the collaboration between Kuomintang\and the Communist Party of China. So those without courage could not propose the national united front policy as a line, for to do so might have been taken as a challenge to the standpoint of the Comintern.
Then the comrades raised many questions.
Should the son of a landlord support the revolution, how should he be treated?
Should a capitalist have donated a lot of money\and provided a great deal of material aid to the Independence Army but wants nothing to do with communists, how should he be approached?
Should a sub-county head mix well with both the people\and the Japanese, can he be enlisted in the revolution?
In reply to these questions I said, in short, that people should be judged mainly by their ideological tendency.
Our views of those days later took shape in the Ten-point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland\and were specified as state policy in the 20-point programme after liberation.
The validity of the anti-Japanese national united front policy we advanced in Kalun was later proved in practice.
Our comrades’ opinions were a great help in perfecting the draft report.
The Kalun Meeting was formally opened in the evening of June 30, 1930.
Our comrades in Kalun prepared a meeting place in a classroom of Jinmyong School. They spread straw mats on the floor of the classroom for the delegates\and hung lamps rom the ceiling.
On the first day of the meeting the delegates listened to my report. The next day they began to discuss measures to carry out the tasks set in the report. The discussions took place in groups\or all together on the riverside\or in the willow grove, while we helped the peasants in their work. Thus the meeting was held in an\original way. We held the meeting with easy minds because the members of the revolutionary\organizations in Kalun were keeping guard in the village. Members of the Children’s Expeditionary Corps also did a lot to protect us during the meeting.
The Japanese imperialists, having smelled out that a large number of young communists had gathered in central Manchuria, dispatched many secret agents to the counties of Changchun, Huaide\and Yitong which were the arena of our activity. Some secret agents carried a photograph of me with them\and asked\where I was.
Informed by the secret agents rom the Japanese consulate in Manchuria\and rom the police affairs department of the government-general in Korea that some young communists belonging to a group different rom those of the old-time communists who differed rom them in the way they conducted their activities had appeared around Jilin in Manchuria\and were expanding their forces, the Japanese imperialists chased us persistently in an effort to capture the leading core elements, straining their nerves rom the beginning. Because we had established a wide foothold\and went deep among the people without making much fuss, they seemed to take us seriously.
At that time Kim Won U was in charge of the guard at the village\and commanded the members of the Children’s Expeditionary Corps\and the AIYL. Even when he was attending a meeting, he would leave stealthily\and patrol the village to check the guard. When I sat up at night because of the pressure of work in the classroom of Jinmyong School, he kept watch outside to ensure my personal safety. Sometimes at night he roasted potatoes in the fire-place in the kitchen of the night-duty room of the school,\and offered me some.
Kim Won U rendered great service in exploring Kalun, Guyushu, Wujiazi\and other areas. He did a lot of work in leading the youth\and student movement in Jilin.
In the spring of 1928 we dispatched him to the rural communities in the Changchun area to make them revolutionary. At the time he was teaching at Jinmyong School\and educating the young people by touring the Kalun\and Guyushu areas. Beginning in the spring of 1930 he took part in the preparations for the formation of the Korean Revolutionary Army, helping Cha Kwang Su. As he had a handsome face we once disguised him as a woman\and sent him to do underground work, “pairing” him with Hyon Gyun as man\and wife.
When he went about to buy weapons after the formation of the Korean Revolutionary Army, he was arrested by the enemy\and imprisoned for several years. Even behind bars he fought staunchly.
When the internal\and external situation was complicated after the Korean war, Kim Won U fell at the hands of the factionalists while fighting in defence of the Party’s line in the provinces. At that time factionalists plotted in various ways to harm those who were faithful to the Party. His\original name was Pyon Muk Song.
Kalun became a reliable base for our activities\and a revolutionary village for realizing our ideas due to the persistent efforts Kim Won U, Kim Ri Gap, Cha Kwang Su, Kim Hyok\and other young communists made earlier to explore the village.
Before we arrived the people there were divided into the southern provinces group\and the northern provinces group\and lived with their backs turned on each other. Once the two groups had a gang fight over water rom the River Wukai. When people rom the southern provinces group blocked the irrigation ditch to reclaim their field, the people rom the northern provinces group came rushing out with their shovels\and reopened the ditch, shouting that their paddy fields were drying up. Even their children were divided into two groups\and would not play together, which was very sad.
Kim Hyok, Kim Won U, Kim Ri Gap, Jang So Bong\and others made a great deal of effort to straighten out the situation. They put an end to the gang fight through persuasion\and formed various mass\organizations, set up a school in Kalun\and provided free education.
In the evening on the second of July the delegates again gathered in the classroom of the school\and resumed the meeting. That evening the meeting was concluded with the announcement of an assignment plan.
Towards the close of the meeting Cha Kwang Su who was presiding over the meeting rose abruptly rom his seat\and made a fervent speech. Nicknamed “boisterous,” he often acted rashly\and easily got excited, but he never lost his reason. He stirred up the hearts of people, addressing them in an impassioned\and fluent speech.
He shook his fist as he spoke:
“While the Korean communist movement is going through\ordeal\and the people are lamenting its setbacks, we here in Kalun have made a historic statement marking a fresh start of the Korean revolution. With this statement heralding a new dawn we Korean communists will advance along a new path.
“Comrades, let us take up arms\and come out in a life-and-death struggle against Japanese imperialism.”
Having heard his speech, we raised shouts of joy\and sang the Revolutionary Song.
We could proclaim the new path for the Korean revolution in Kalun because already in the course of the youth\and student movement launched in our days in Jilin we had established the Juche stand on\and attitude towards the Korean revolution\and cleared a new path for the communist movement. I made public in The Path of the Korean Revolution the idea\and standpoint I had perceived in my days of struggle\and elaborated in prison.
This has become the line of our revolution\and its guiding idea.
We can say that the content of the treatise was based entirely on the Juche idea.
Since then the idea has been steadily developed\and enriched through the various stages of the revolution, including the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle,\and through a difficult\and complicated practical struggle\and it has become a philosophical idea in which ideas, theories\and methods have been brought together as an integral whole as we now see it.
It was when we were building the foundation of socialism after the war that we particularly stressed the need to establish Juche after liberation.
I delivered a speech on eliminating dogmatism\and the worship of the great powers\and establishing Juche to Party propaganda\and agitation workers in 1955. It was made public in the document On Eliminating Dogmatism\and Formalism\and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work.
Later I stressed the need to establish Juche whenever the occasion offered itself.
Time\and again I explained, in my talks with foreigners, the essence of the Juche idea, how it had been created\and implemented.
But I never thought of systematizing it\and publishing it in book form. If our people accepted the idea as just\and implemented it in their revolutionary practice, I was satisfied.
Later Secretary Kim Jong Il systematized the idea in a comprehensive manner\and published his treatise On the Juche Idea.
We became convinced, while waging the anti-Japanese armed struggle after the Kalun Meeting, that the line we advanced at the meeting was just. The enemy likened us to “a\drop in the ocean,” but we had an ocean of people with inexhaustible strength behind us. Whatever line we put forward, the people easily understood it\and made it their own,\and they aided us materially\and spiritually, sending tens of thousands of their sons, daughters, brothers\and sisters to join our ranks.
We could defeat the strong enemy who was armed to the teeth, fighting against him in the severe cold of up to 40 degrees below zero in Manchuria for over 15 years, because we had a mighty fortress called the people\and the boundless ocean called the masses.
[이 게시물은 편집국님에 의해 2020-05-29 16:15:32 새 소식에서 복사 됨]
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